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JUST PUCKER AND BLOW?: AN ANALYSIS
OF CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWERS, THE
DUTY OF CARE, THE DUTY OF LOYALTY,
AND THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
LEONARD M. BAYNESt
"You know how to whistle, don'tyou, Steve? You just put
your lips together-andblow."'
INTRODUCTION

In the past year, we have seen a number of corporate
scandals involving major business entities such as Enron,
Adelphia, Worldcom, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, and Martha

Stewart. The New York Daily News described this bad behavior
by corporate executives in a caption entitled "These Little
Piggies Went to Market."2 Newsweek magazine in a headline
called these executives the "Bad Boys Club." 3 Well-known
financial journalist Lou Dobbs called the bad boy executives
"CEO Hogs." 4 In addition, we have seen scenes of the Adelphia
senior executives being carted off to jail in handcuffs like
common criminals doing the so-called "perp walk."5 This corrupt

conduct has involved various instances of fraud, ranging from
using generally unacceptable accounting principles (like using
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., New York
University; J.D., M.B.A., Columbia University. The author would like to thank
Professor Michael A. Perino for arranging the Symposium: Enron and Its Aftermath,
St. John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York (Sept. 20, 2002). In
addition, I would also like to thank the expert research assistance from Ben Darvil,
John Di Bari, Brian Levine, and Kristina Runje.
1 Lauren Bacall to Humphrey Bogart, To HAVE AND HAVE NOT (Warner Bros.
1944), available at http://www.filmsite.org/toha.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
2 Nancy Dillon & Corky Siemaszko, These Little Piggies Went to Market, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, June 9, 2002, at 4.
3 Allan Sloan, Bad Boys Club, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 2002, at 44.
4 Lou Dobbs, Payback Time for CEO Hogs, availableat http://www.iamawlodge
1426.org/news45.htm (June 9, 2002).
5 Howard Fineman & Michael Isikoff, Laying Down the Law, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
5, 2002, at 20, 23.
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partnerships to hide corporate losses and treating ordinary
expenses as capital expenses to increase corporate profits), to
providing exorbitant loans to senior executives. 6 Insider trading
also has been alleged.7 These scandals have led investors to be
fearful of investing in the stock market. They also have caused
major corporations difficultly in attracting CEOs,8 as well as
prompted soul searching over the direction of our capitalist
system,9 the decision to become a corporate executive, 10 and
whether the United States has a two-tiered moral system-one
for bosses and one for the rest."
In the midst of this new anti-corporate environment,
corporate whistleblowers recently have received a lot of favorable
press. For instance, Sherron Watkins has been described as the
whistleblower who exposed the Enron fraud, although even she
admits that she was not the first person at Enron to complain
about its shady accounting practices. 12 In many respects, Ms.
Watkins was the prototypical, yet atypical, corporate
whistleblower.
This Article will examine the fiduciary
obligations of corporate insiders who want to blow the whistle.
It will compare the executives' contemporaneous (and often
6 Kurt Eichenwald, Could Capitalists Actually Bring Down Capitalism?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2002, S4, at 1.
7 See, e.g., Marc Peyser, The Insiders, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 2002, at 38.
8 Joann Lublin & Carol Hymowitz, Fearing Scandals, Executives Spurn CEO
Job Offers, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at Al.
9 See Eichenwald, supranote 6.
10 See Tim Race, New Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at C1 (subtitled
"Ashamed to be an Executive").
11 Barbara Ehrenreich, Two-Tiered Morality, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, S4, at
15.
12 Anonymous letter from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay (Aug. 20, 2001),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/enron/index.html (last visited Oct.
31, 2002) [hereinafter Watkins Letter] (noting that Treasurer Jeff McMahon, being
"highly vexed" over the accounting practices, laid out five steps to be taken to
remain as treasurer, but was transferred to be CEO of a related company). In
addition, Ms.Watkins reported that she heard one Enron manager say, "I know it
would be devastating to all of us, but I wish we would get caught. We're such a
crooked company." Id. Vice-President Cliff Baxter also complained about the
inappropriateness of the Enron transactions with its affiliated partnerships. See id.;
see also Paul Duggan, Note May Explain Death of Ex-Enron Executive, WASH. POST,
Jan. 27, 2002, at A9 (noting that although many speculated that Baxter's death
prior to his testimony before the Congress was the result of foul play, an autopsy
indicated that his death was indeed the result of suicide); Eric Hanson & Armando
Villafranca, Baxter's Suicide Note Cites Emotional Burden, HOUST. CHRON., Apr.
12, 2002, at Al (noting Sherron Watkins referenced Baxter's complaints in her
August memo to Enron CEO Ken Lay).
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conflicting) duties of care and loyalty. It will show how the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act") attempts to address these
issues by providing some protection against retaliation. Finally,
this Article will highlight the various considerations that the Act
failed to address, but that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) should take into account when promulgating
its rules of implementation.
I.

THE ULTIMATE WHISTLEBLOWER, SHERRON WATKINS

Ms. Watkins was a Vice-President at Enron Corp. 13 She
earned a master's degree in professional accounting from the
University of Texas at Austin. In 1982, she began her career as
an auditor with the accounting firm Arthur Andersen, spending
eight years at its Houston and New York offices. 14 In 1983, she
became a certified public accountant.' 5 Enron Vice-President
Andrew Fastow hired Ms. Watkins to manage Enron's
partnership with the California Public Employee Retirement
System. 16 From June to August 2001, Ms. Watkins worked
directly for Mr. Fastow. 17 During this time, Ms. Watkins learned
that Enron was engaging in accounting improprieties with
certain affiliated entities.'
She believed that Enron was using
its own stock to generate gains and losses on its income
statement. 19
Ms. Watkins testified before the House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations that she failed to
receive satisfactory explanations regarding these accounting
transactions from Enron executives. 20 Ms. Watkins admitted
that she was troubled by the accounting practices but was
13 See The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part3: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
107th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Sherron Watkins, Vice-President of
Corporate
Development,
Enron
Corp.),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107-househearings&doc
id=f:77991.wais [hereinafter Watkins Testimony].
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.

Ms. Watkins held that position until 1996. From 1997 to 2000, Ms.
Watkins worked for Enron International and worked on mergers and acquisitions.
She was later transferred to Enron Broadband Services. Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. (noting that some Enron assets were hedged against the Raptor entity
owned by LJM partnership, which was run by Mr. Fastow. Unlike other hedged
assets, the Raptor hedged assets did not have a locked-in sale price). Id.
19 Id.
20 See

id.
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uncomfortable reporting them to either Mr. Fastow or former
Enron President Jeff Skilling,2 1 fearing termination if she
approached them directly. 22 On August 15, 2001, Ms. Watkins
sent to Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron, a seven-page
anonymous letter. 23 In the letter, Ms. Watkins asked, "Has
Enron become a risky place to work?" 24
She also more
specifically described the accounting improprieties and stated
that "to the layman on the street [it will look like] we are hiding
losses in a related company and will compensate that company
with Enron stock in the future."25 She shared her prescient fears
26
that Enron might "implode in a wave of accounting scandals."
On August 22, 2001, Ms. Watkins met with Mr. Lay 27 and
outlined her concerns about the accounting improprieties, and
requested a transfer from working for Mr. Fastow. 28 In late
August she was reassigned to the human resources group. 29 Ms.
Watkins reported that Mr. Lay assured her that he would
investigate the irregularities. 30 Ms. Watkins never reported her
concerns to the SEC, the Department of Treasury, or any other
governmental official.
Upon Ms. Watkins's disclosure, Mr. Lay passed Ms.
Watkins's letter to Enron's general counsel, James V. Derrick,
who hired Enron's attorneys, Vinson & Elkins, to investigate,
even though the law firm was involved in some of the
transactions that Ms. Watkins criticized. 31 The Vinson & Elkins
Id.
22 Id.
21

23 Watkins Letter, supra note 12.
24

Id.

25 Id. (noting that Enron had reported gains of $550 million of fair value on
stocks via swaps with Raptor, but much of the stock declined in value so that Enron
would have to offset the losses).
26 Id.
27 Ms.Watkins reported that she first met with Cindy Olson on August 16 and

showed her a copy of the previously anonymous letter. See Watkins Testimony,
supra note 13.
28 Id. W. Carl Jordan of Vinson & Elkins advised Enron to agree to her transfer
to a position of comparable responsibility and to document the move in a
memorandum. See Enron Got Legal Advice on How to Handle Dissidents, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2002, at A2. He also suggested that Enron designate a

company officer for her to contact in the event that Ms. Watkins believed that she
was being retaliated against. E-mail from Carl Jordan to Sharon Butcher (Enron),
Confidential Employee Matter (Aug. 24, 2001).
29 Watkins Testimony, supra note 13.
30 Id. at 20.
31 Kurt Eichenwald, Another Inquiry: Company Hobbled Investigation by Its
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report indicates that Mr. Derrick acknowledged the "downside of
hiring Vinson & Elkins because it had been involved."32 Mr.
Derrick concluded that that the decision to hire Vinson & Elkins
was permissible because the investigation was to be a
"preliminary one." 33 Vinson & Elkins (along with Arthur
Andersen) 34 investigated Ms. Watkins's allegations, but used no
independent accountant.
This investigation reported only
limited cosmetic problems and no illegal activities. 35 Vinson &
Elkins' investigation, however, "was largely predetermined by
the scope and nature of the investigation and the process
36
employed."
Law Firm, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A19.
32 Id.

Id.
Andersen may have also gotten into trouble because it allowed regional
partners to overrule auditing experts, known as the Professional Standards Group
(PSG). Andersen e-mails and memos show that Andersen's PSG vigorously objected
to Enron's accounting practices, but they were overruled by regional Andersen
partners who falsely wrote memos that the PSG approved of the transactions. Mike
McNamee, Out of Control: Internal Memos Detail How the Firm's Unusually Lax
ControlsAllowed Its Enron Team to Call the Shots, BUS. WK, Apr. 8, 2002, at 32. A
former Andersen employee said that local control over accounting issues was a
selling point, and the effect was insidious because the "rainmakers were given the
power to overrule the accounting nerds." Id. at 33.
35 Naftali Bendavid, Enron's Law Firm Begins to Draw Fire, CHIC. TRIB., Mar.
14, 2002, at 17; Samantha Miller & Gabrielle Cosgriff, To Tell the Truth, PEOPLE,
Feb. 4, 2002, at 63. However, Joseph Dilg, managing partner of Vinson & Elkins,
testified before Congress that "Vinson & Elkins did not advise Enron that there
were no problems. Our written ...reports pointed out significant issues ....
" The
FinancialCollapse of Enron:HearingBefore the House Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Joseph C. Dilg, Managing Partner, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.). Rep.
Christopher Shays, Republican from Connecticut, thought that Vinson & Elkins
"became too cozy with Enron and did not provide reasonable scrutiny of its
dealings." Bendavid, supra. Harry Reasoner, Senior Partner at Vinson & Elkins,
charged that "Enron's primary counsel were their in-house legal staff....IT]hey
had 250 lawyers." Id. Mr. Reasoner does not discuss the fact that many of Enron's
in-house lawyers started their careers at Vinson & Elkins. See id.
36 Eichenwald, supra note 31. Some of the problems with Vinson & Elkins'
review might be due to the restrictions that Enron placed on Vinson & Elkins'
investigation. The law firm was told not to review the underlying accounting issues,
which went to the heart of Ms. Watkins's allegations. Id. Enron, however, was
Vinson & Elkins' single largest accounting client and comprised seven percent of
Vinson & Elkins' total revenue. Mike France et al., One Big Client, One Big Hassle:
Vinson & Elkins' Heavy Reliance on Enron is Now a Potential Liability for the Law
Firm, BUS. WK., Jan. 28, 2002, at 39. In addition, according to one undisclosed
Enron employee, "[Enron] might not have been able to pull off many of the
transactions.. .without Vinson & Elkins' opinion letters." Id.
33
34
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In October 2001, before Enron announced a huge third
quarter loss, Arthur Andersen auditors, in a memo, warned
Enron officials that its public explanation for the loss "was
potentially misleading and illegal."37 On October 16, 2001,
Enron announced a $618 million third quarter loss. 38 Two weeks
later, the SEC announced that it was investigating Enron. 39 In
early November, Enron announced that, since 1997, it had
overstated its earnings by $586 million. 40 On December 2, 2001,
Enron filed for bankruptcy. 41 On January 23, 2002, Ken Lay
resigned as CEO of Enron, stating "we need someone at the helm
who can focus 100 percent of his efforts on reorganizing the
42
company."
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF SHERRON WATKINS' ACTIONS

Ms. Watkins is the prototypical whistleblower because she
had knowledge of damaging information and she disclosed it to
her supervisor's supervisor. At the same time, she is very
atypical for several reasons. First, as an accountant, she had the
expertise to know that her corporation was possibly breaking the
law and defrauding the public. Second, her disclosure in and of
itself to the president of the corporation did not lead to the type
of investigation that was necessary to stop any wrongdoing. Her
actions did not cause the immediate collapse of the Enron
financial giant. Third, even though she "ratted" out her boss and
may have engaged in insider trading herself,43 her disclosure did
37 Robert Schlesinger, Enron Chief Executive Lay Resigns Anderson Memo Says
Firm Was Warned in October (sic), BOST. GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2002, at A2 (noting thenAndersen partner David Duncan wrote the warning memo). Arthur Andersen later
fired Mr. Duncan because of his alleged role in destroying documents related to

Enron. Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.

42 Id. (Lay stated that his decision was "reached in cooperation" with Enron's
creditors committee and that he would remain a member of Enron's board of
directors).Id.

43 In her testimony before the House of Representatives, Ms. Watkins
acknowledged that she traded about $47,000 in Enron stock about the time that she
was blowing her whistle. She claimed that she was selling the stock because she
routinely diversified, and that the transactions in October 2001 were a "kneejerk
reaction" to September 1lth. The Financial Collapse of Enron: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Sherron Watkins, Vice-President
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not compromise her job security. In fact, Ms. Watkins has
received a lot of positive press from her actions. 44 Many have
called Ms. Watkins a hero and courageous. 45 Ms. Watkins was
even named Time magazine's "Person of the Week." 46
Washington Post reporter Paul Farhi noted that women like
Sherron Watkins often are perceived to be insiders with
"outsider values" and are more likely to blow the whistle than
their male counterparts. 47 A movie deal also is reportedly in the
works that will paint Ms.Watkins as a "feminist icon," like Erin
Brockovich. 48 After her disclosure, Ms.Watkins testified that
Cindy Olson told her that Mr. Fastow wanted to terminate her
employment and have her computer seized. Instead, she was
moved to a different position and was advised to download all
pertinent data from her computer. She thus retained a job and
became a symbol for corporate whistleblowers. In fact, since the
collapse of Enron, the number of e-mailed complaints received by
of Corporate Development, Enron Corp.). For insider trading liability, an insider
like Ms. Watkins must either refrain from trading or disclose any non-public
information, neither of which she did.
44 Katie Fairbank, You Know How to Whistle, Don't You?, DALLAS MORN.
NEWS, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1A; Lauded by Lawmakers, Enron Whistle-Blower Escapes
the Worst, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 15, 2002 [hereinafter Lauded by
Lawmakers]. But see Julie Mason, The Fall of Enron; Watkins' Own Ethics
Questioned, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2002, at 21 (noting that Watkins, as a Certified
Public Accountant, may have been obligated to report her concerns to state
regulators or to the Securities and Exchange Commission). But see Curtis C.
Verschoor, Ethics of Enron "Whistle-Blower" Questioned, 83 STRATEGIC FINANCE
(May 1, 2002) (noting that since Ms. Watkins was not involved in the Andersen
extrinsic audit, she was not subject to SEC Rule 10A requiring CPA reporting to the
board of directors and the SEC of illegal client acts).
45 See generally Fairbank, supra note 44; Lauded by Lawmakers, supranote 44.
46 Frank Pellegrini, Person of the Week: "Enron Whistleblower" Sherron
Watkins, Time.com (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://www.time.comltime/
pow/printout/0,8816,194927,00.html (noting she was not technically a whistleblower
since she should have blown the whistle by writing to the Houston Chronicle long
before August). The Article suggests that maybe her memo was a "cover your ass"
memo. See also Dan Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, But Blew It,
Forbes.com (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.forbes.com/2002/0214/
0214watkins.html (asserting that Ms.Watkins' actions actually provided cover for
Lay and the Enron board because her warning allowed Lay to assert that he had no
prior knowledge and needed to be warned).
47 Paul Farhi, A Whistle That Can Pierce the Glass Ceiling, WASH. POST, July 6,
2002, at C1 (noting that the most recent whistleblowers have been women,
including Cynthia Cooper, the internal auditor at WorldCom, Coleen Rowley, the
FBI lawyer who detailed mistakes in the September l1th investigation, and
Sherron Watkins).
48 See Ackman, supra note 46.
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the SEC increased from an average of 325 per day in 2001 to 763
49
e-mails received on February 5, 2002.
So whistleblowing now is viewed more favorably than it had
been historically.
At least, in the popular press, the
whistleblower is portrayed as heroic. In Sophocles's Antigone, a
messenger tells Creon that someone has given proper funeral
rites to Polyneices' body and remarks "no[one] delights in the
bearer of bad news."50 As evidenced by this ancient Greek play,
society has often blamed and disliked the bearer of bad news.
Even in our more recent American history, whistleblowers have
or
often been portrayed as liars, 51 sometimes vile
untrustworthy,5 2 and sometimes, even racist. 53 Ms. Watkins is
very lucky; the press and the business community probably were
looking for at least one person that they could call a hero in this
whole sordid affair, and she came closest to being one. Despite
the recent positive press for Ms. Watkins, whistleblowing is
fraught with dangers and risks. Whistleblowing sits at the
vortex of a corporate officer's fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.

49 See Fairbank, supra note 44.
50 SOPHOCLES,
ANTIGONE, available at http://classics.mit.edu/Sophocles/
antigone.pl.txt (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
51 Some thought that John Dean, who testified against former President
Richard Nixon in the Watergate hearings, was initially lying, until the Watergate
tapes were released. See Len Colodny, Hidden History: The Day Nixon Lost His
Presidency, The Nixon Era Times, available at http://www.watergate.com/stories/
watergate.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2002) ("ITihe truth [was] never something that
Dean ever [let] get in the way of his version of events.").
52 Many Americans had a very low opinion of Linda Tripp, who taped the
telephone conversations of her friend Monica Lewinsky, which were used in the
impeachment proceedings against former President Bill Clinton. See Keating
Holland, Poll: Most Americans Hold Unfavorable Views Of Tripp, Lewinsky,
available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/07/02/poll (July 2, 1998)
(finding 52% of Americans have an unfavorable opinion of Tripp).
53 Recently Eunice Stone reported that she overheard three American Muslim
medical students making threats of terrorist acts in South Florida on September
13th at a Shoney's restaurant in Georgia. She followed the students into the
parking lot and reported their license plates to the authorities. A region-wide terror
alert was announced, and the three men were apprehended and detained for over
seventeen hours. They were released when the authorities found no incriminating
evidence. After this incident, people question whether the students were playing a
hoax or whether Ms. Stone might have been stereotyping them because of their
swarthy appearance. See generally Clarence Page, Editorial, Muslim Students
Victims of Paranoia,GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 24, 2002, at A9; Robert Steinback,
Who, If Anybody, Erred in AlligatorAlley Terror Scare, MIAMI HER., Sept. 21, 2002,
at 1.
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The whistleblower may be damned if she does "just pucker and
blow," and damned if she does not.
III. OFFICERS AND OTHER SENIOR MANAGERS

Corporations specify the number and types of officers in
55
their bylaws. 54 The board of directors appoints the officers.
The officers select the senior managers. Both corporate officers
and senior managers can be removed from their positions at any
time.5 6 An officer in performing her duties shall act in good
faith, with the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances, and in a
manner that the officer reasonably believes will be in the best
interests of the corporation.5 7 Non-officer senior managers are
agents of the corporation and, as such, are governed by the law
of agency. As agents, these senior managers also have fiduciary
duties to the corporation.
A.

The Duty of Loyalty

Corporate officers and senior executives have a duty of
loyalty to the corporation. They must act in good faith and in a
manner that they reasonably believe will be in the best interests
of the corporation, 58 including
safeguarding corporate
information. 59 Many times, these duties are buttressed by
corporate
requirements
that
these
individuals
sign
confidentiality agreements. In Coady v. Harpo, Inc.,60 Elizabeth
Coady, a former senior associate producer of The Oprah Winfrey
Show, signed an agreement entitled "Business Ethics,
Objectivity, and Confidentiality Policy." 61
The agreement
required Ms. Coady to keep confidential, during her employment
and thereafter, all information about Ms. Winfrey and her

54 MODEL

Bus.

CORP. ACT

§

8.40(a) (1999); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 142(a)

(Aspen Supp. 2002).
55 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 8.40(b) (1999); DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 142(b)

(Aspen Supp. 2002).
56 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.43(b) (1999). See generally Shapiro v. Stahl, 195
F. Supp. 822, 826 (M.D. Pa. 1961) (noting that agency relationships can be

terminated at any time by mutual consent).
57 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42(a)(1)-(3) (1999).
58 Id.

59 See id; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42(d)(2) (1984).
60 719 N.E.2d 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
61 Id. at 246.
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production company. The Court found that the agreement was
enforceable. 62 In addition, a corporation may require senior
executives to sign agreements granting to the corporation all
ownership of their work product. These agreements strengthen
the executive's fiduciary obligations to the corporation and
specifically make the executive liable for conversion of
property. 63 They clarify what property the corporation owns. If
the senior executive uses any property of the corporation,
without authority, she is liable to the corporation irrespective of
whether the property was used in competition against the
principal. 64
Providing confidential information to law
enforcement authorities might constitute conversion.
More
specifically, New York makes it illegal to duplicate computerstored information regardless of whether the information is
65
available elsewhere.
The confidentiality and assignment of property rights
agreements often give the corporation protections above and
beyond the basic common law or statutory fiduciary duties. In
addition, these agreements may be tied into the agent's duty to
obey the principal. "In every contract of service it is implied that
-66
the employee shall obey the lawful orders of the master ....
The rationales for these kinds of confidentiality agreements and
for imposing the duty of loyalty and obedience on senior
executives are twofold. First, the duty is designed to protect the
employer from economic exploitation by the employee.
For
example, in Wexler v. Greenberg,67 the court stated that "[slociety
as a whole greatly benefits from technological improvements.
Without some means of post-employment protection to assure
that valuable developments or improvements are exclusively
those of the employer, the businessman could not afford to
subsidize research or improve current methods."68 Second, the
duty of loyalty is enmeshed in notions of morality and is
62
63
64
65

Id. at 251.
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 402 (1958).
Miller v. Dean Witter & Co., 314 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.30 (Consol. 2000).

66 Walker v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 80 N.J.L. 342, 344 (1911); see
also Granite State Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitten, 98 F. Supp. 706, 710 (D. Colo. 1951), affd,

196 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1952).
67 160 A.2d 430 (Pa. 1960) (involving the chemist of a soap manufacturer who
stole a trade secret).
68 Id. at 434-35.
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designed to protect employers who may be vulnerable to
For instance, the court in
exploitation from employees.
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner 69 stated that "[flairness
dictates that an employee not be permitted to exploit the trust of
his employer so as to obtain an unfair advantage in competing
70
with the employer in a matter concerning the latter's business."
The nature of the corporation requires it to rely on the officers
and managers to run the day-to-day business. These employees
have access to a very precious commodity, that is, vital and
privileged corporate information. In the more mundane duty of
loyalty cases, the senior executive has access to important
corporate information dealing with customer lists,71 customer
preferences, 72 customer pricing, 73 new opportunities, 74 and secret
75
formulas.
Even though these cases and examples generally deal with a
senior executive stealing corporate opportunities, these
For
principles still apply in the whistleblowing context.
example, the whistleblower may convert corporate proprietary
information by taking corporate records and sharing them with
the authorities. The whistleblower could disclose information
that, at worst, could lead to civil or criminal liabilities for the
corporation and its other senior officers and directors. At best,
certain disclosures could lead to significant embarrassment or
humiliation.
In either case, deciding how to make such
disclosures would usually be a decision of the board of directors
and senior managers of the corporation. For example, if the
disclosure might give rise to criminal or civil liability, the
corporation under the best of circumstances would want to vest
its decision with its attorneys in an effort to minimize its
potential liability and maximize profits. If the whistleblower
69 382 A.2d 564 (Md. 1978).
70 Id. at 568.
71 See, e.g., Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newbery, 147 N.E.2d
724 (N.Y. 1958) (involving customers' names taken by departing house cleaners).
72 See, e.g., Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 325 N.W.2d 883

(Wis.1982) (involving customer lists, which contained detailed information on
customer insurance policies).

73 See, e.g., Ackerman v. Kimball Intl, Inc. 634 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
74 See, e.g., Gen. Auto. Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. 1963)
(concluding that a general manager made secret profits by turning over some

business to competitors).
75 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94-C6838, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19437 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1995).
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discloses the information, she may make it impossible for the
corporation and other senior executives to obtain a good deal
from prosecutors. If the information disclosed is not rooted in
civil or criminal misconduct, but nevertheless is scandalous, the
corporation may want to refrain from disclosing such
information. The whistleblower may cause a great deal of public
relations harm by disclosing such information. Because of this
knowledge, senior executives know where the corporation may be
most vulnerable. The senior managers are in a position to inflict
76
harm on the corporation in a way that strangers cannot.
B.

The Duty of Care

Corporate officers and senior executives have a duty of care
to the corporation. They have an obligation to perform their
duties with the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances. 77 This duty
has been analogized to the diligence, care, and skill that
ordinarily prudent individuals would exercise in the
management of their affairs. The classic example of a breach of
the duty of care is demonstrated in Francis v. United Jersey
Bank. 78 In Francis, Mrs. Pritchard and her sons were the
shareholders and directors of a reinsurance brokerage business.
When Mrs. Pritchard's husband died, she inherited forty-eight
percent of the corporation's stock. Her two sons owned the
remaining fifty-two percent. 79 Before he died, Mrs. Pritchard's
husband warned her that his son Charles would "take the shirt
8 0 After
off my back....,"
her husband's death, Mrs. Pritchard
became depressed and drank heavily.8 1 She paid no attention to
the business, and she failed to review any of the corporation's
financial reports. As a consequence of her failure to monitor, her
sons misappropriated over twelve million dollars.
The court found that Mrs. Pritchard had breached her duty
of care.8 2 The Francis court explained that corporate executives
76 Terry A. O'Neill, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency
Debate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 705 (1993).
77 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42(a)(1)-(3)(1984).
78 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).

79 Id. at 818.
8o Id.at 819.
81 Id. at 819-20.
82 In this case, Mrs. Pritchard breached her duty of care to the creditors of the
corporation because the corporation held funds in trust for creditors. Id. at 829.
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are under a duty to obtain at least a rudimentary understanding
of the business of the corporation. They are also under a
continuing obligation to monitor and be informed about the
corporation.
More may be expected of senior corporate
executives than of mere board members.8 3 For instance, in Bates
v. Dresser,8 4 the Court found the bank president liable for the
failure to detect and stop the bookkeeper's embezzlement.8 5 The
86
Court, however, failed to find the bank's board members liable.
The Court reasoned that the board members had no reason to
suspect a problem, whereas the bank president had discovered
several incidents that should have alerted him to the
bookkeeper's dishonesty.8 7 Of course, the Francis court points
out that these senior executives can absolve themselves from
liability by objecting to any wrongdoing or resigning.8 8 In fact,
the duty may exceed merely resigning and objecting in cases
where the corporation is in a precarious financial condition and
an implied trust exists in which the corporation holds funds. In
those cases, the duties imposed on senior executives might
require them to use "all reasonable action to stop the continuing
conversion." 89
In the case of whistleblowing, tension between the duty of
loyalty and duty of care exists. The senior executive is required
to disclose her objections to certain actions that she believes are
illegal. But how is she supposed to do that? As a non-director
officer, she could disclose her objections to her supervisor or her
supervisor's supervisor like Sherron Watkins did at Enron. This
objection may take the form of a "cover your ass" memo. But will
this really stop wrongdoing? In some cases, such a memo may be
insufficient to stop the wrongdoing, and the senior executive may
83 This enhanced fiduciary duty for officers as opposed to directors is analogous
to the enhanced duties that managing partners have in a partnership. See generally
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 463-65 (N.Y. 1928).
84 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
85 Id. at 530-31.

86 Id. at 529-30.
87 Id. at 530-31.
88 See generally Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981)
(dealing with the responsibilities of the corporate director to address wrongdoing by
other members of the board; this rule probably applies to officers and senior

executives). Cf id. at 823 (pointing out "the fulfillment of the duty of a director may
call for more than mere objection and resignation. Sometimes a director may be
required to seek the advice of counsel").
89 Id. at 827.
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have an obligation to report the matter to the authorities. She
may, however, be in a bind because her contractual obligations
and her duty of loyalty responsibilities may limit the type of
information that she could give to the authorities. In addition,
unless someone has real inside information allowing them to
actually observe the wrongdoing and has the expertise to know
that the wrongdoing is illegal, what safe harbor exists to protect
the senior executive from mistakenly reporting wrongdoing? This
conflict may place the senior executive in a dilemma, which the
Act does not totally ease.

IV. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT'S WHISTLEBLOWING PROTECTIONS
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the protections for private 90
corporate whistleblowers varied depending upon state law.
Because of these varied protections, senior officers and managers
had to worry about the fact that, in some states, they held their
jobs at will. Therefore, they could be fired at any time for no
reason. Forty-two states and the District of Columbia, however,
now recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 91 These
statutes and rulings protect at-will employees who "blow the
whistle" on important public policy issues. 92 Therefore, an
employee who is terminated for refusing to violate the law or for
reporting a violation of the law can bring an action for wrongful
discharge against her employer. Upon successful litigation of
her suit, the "wronged" employee can get damages 93 and
reinstatement to her job. The interpretations of what constitutes
protected whistleblowing varies depending on the state. 94 One of
90 In contrast, government whistleblowers were afforded a variety of statutory
protections under the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b), and the
Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201, and its 1994 amendments. 140

CONG. REC. S14668-70, H11419-22 (Oct. 7, 1994).
91 TOM DEVINE, GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, THE WHISTLEBLOWER'S
SURVIVAL GUIDE: COURAGE WITHOUT MARTYRDOM 133-34 (1997).
92 Id.
93 See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will

Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 449, 479-95 (1985) (discussing that several
states allow punitive damages for such wrongful dismissals); see also Elletta
Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 129-30 (2000) (noting that "[sleveral courts have
considered the monetary relief available to whistleblowers who have statutory
claims... [however,] [tihe majority of courts have not allowed punitive damages
under the relevant whistleblower act, particularly if the state is the defendant").
94 DEVINE, supra note 91 (noting that there might be additional federal
protection tucked away in the confines of a variety of specialty statutes dealing with
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the goals of the Act was to afford a whistleblowing employee the
95 Most
same protection irrespective of her state of residence.
state claims for wrongful retaliation revolved around claims for
wrongful discharge based on the employee's termination for
refusing to violate a law, rule, or regulation or for reporting such
violation. 96 The employee could, however, be fired if the reported
behavior did not actually violate an existing law. For example,
in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion,97 a partner, Bohatch, reported to
the law firm's managing partner that one of the partners was
over billing a client. 98 The next day, the accused partner told
Ms. Bohatch that the same client was dissatisfied with her
work. 99 The law firm investigated the allegations, determined
that the client was satisfied that the bills were reasonable, and
terminated Ms. Bohatch. 10 0 The court refused to recognize an
anti-retaliation exception to the at-will nature of partnerships. 10 1
Most states seem to protect employees who report issues of
safety or who are required to report safety violations. 10 2 Those
employees who were merely reporting failures to follow company
procedure were least protected. 10 3 In addition, several states
deny protection for those whistleblowers who make unfounded
10 4
claims or who fail to sufficiently investigate their claims.
These states merely require that the employee's allegation be
made in "good faith." 105
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits any public company from
discriminating against any employee who lawfully provides
information or otherwise assists in an investigation of conduct
that the employee "reasonably believes" constitutes a violation of
the federal securities laws. 10 6 This provision was designed from
environmental protection, occupational health and safety, or labor regulations).

95
96
97
98

See CONG. REc. S7420 (July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 93, at 105.
977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
Id. at 544.

99 Id.
100 Id. at 544-45.

101 See id. at 546-47 (restating general rule that "a law firm can expel a partner
to protect relationships both within the firm and with clients" and declining to carve
out anti-retaliation exception).
102 See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 93, at 105-07, 113-14, 118.
103 Id. at 106-07, 113-14, 118.
104 Id. at 121.

Id.
106 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §806(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 802
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).
105
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the lessons learned from Sherron Watkins's testimony. As
Senator Patrick Leahy stated, "'We learned from Sherron
Watkins of Enron that these corporate insiders are the key
witnesses that need to be encouraged to report fraud and help
prove it in court.'"107 The legislation protects an employee from
retaliation by an employer for testifying before Congress or a
federal regulatory agency, or giving evidence to law enforcement
of possible securities fraud violations. 0 8
To secure this
protection, the employee must have assisted in an investigation,
which was conducted by Congress, a federal agency, the
employee's supervisor, or anyone else authorized by the
employer to conduct an investigation. 10 9 Under the Act, within
ninety days of the discriminatory act, the employee must file an
administrative claim with the Secretary of Labor. 110 If the
Secretary of Labor fails to issue a final decision within 180 days
of filing of the complaint,"' the employee can bring a private
cause of action at law or equity for de novo review in federal
district court. 112 Relief available under this statute shall include
compensatory damages, such as reinstatement with the same
level of seniority, back pay with interest, and any special
damages, that is, litigation costs, expert witness fees, and
reasonable attorney fees. 113 In addition, every public company is
required to establish mechanisms to allow the employees to
provide information anonymously to the corporation's board of
4
directors."
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to promote investor
confidence by ensuring that the public receives more information
about possible corporate fraud. Such disclosures would ensure
that the markets have perfect information so that investors
could make informed investment choices.
Senator Leahy
reported that the Act is designed to "include all good faith and
107 The Truth Is Out There, LEGAL WK. GLOBAL, Aug. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.legalweek.net/ViewItem.asp?id=10241.
108 Sarbanes-Oxley Paves Way For Potential Whistleblowers, Too, (CNNFN
television broadcast, Aug. 5, 2002) (Interview of Peter Zlotnick, corporate attorney,
Mintz Levin); Transcript # 080505cb.129.

109 Id.
110 Sarbanes-Oxley

(A)).

Act § 806(b)(1)(A) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)

111 Id. § 806(b)(1)(B) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B)).
112
113
114

Id. § 806(b)(1)-(2) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)-(2)).
Id. § 806(c) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)).
Id. § 301(m)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f-(m)(4)).
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reasonable' reporting of fraud, and there should be no
presumption that reporting is otherwise, absent specific
evidence." 115 This reasonable person standard would include the
usual standard used in a variety of contexts. 1 6 In fact, Senator
Leahy stated that the type of action taken by the corporation or
the agency would be "strong indicia that it could support such a
reasonable belief."" 7 In addition, Senator Leahy explained that
the whistleblowing provision would exclude unlawful actions
such as the "improper public disclosure of trade secret
8
information.""1
Undoubtedly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides an extra
level of protection for employees. Despite this added protection
and the increased prominence of whistleblowers, we must be
cognizant that federal whistleblowers have low success rates in
their suits before government agencies. The Whistleblowers
Survival Guide reports that "the rate of success for winning a
reprisal lawsuit on the merits in administrative hearings for
federal whistleblower laws has risen to between 25 and 33
percent in recent years."" 9 Under the Act, the corporate senior
executive or employee is likely to confront some of the same
dilemmas, which the Act does not quite address, and is likely to
also have a low rate of success under its whistleblowing
provisions. First, the statute only affords protection against
retaliations based on securities fraud. 120 Whistleblowing of other
kinds of wrongdoing remain unprotected under this Act. In
these cases, the whistleblower then must rely on the vagaries of
state law, which generally give preference to those allegations
dealing with public safety. For example, a senior executive may
overhear a high-ranking executive make disparaging remarks
about a particular racial group and state that he would never
hire or promote members of that group.
The corporation
employs very few members of this particular group and has none
in senior management. The senior executive believes that the
corporation is engaged in race discrimination.
The senior
115 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VIII OF H.R. 2673: THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002, 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
116

Id.

Id.
Id.
119 DEVINE, supra note 91, at 116.
120 See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a)(1)
§ 1514A(a)(1)).
117

118

(to

be

codified

at

18

U.S.C.
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executive has a fiduciary obligation to hold certain corporate
information like employee demographics in confidence but has
an obligation to resign or object from his position when
confronting corporate wrongdoing. The Act provides protection
only for those matters that involve security fraud. If this senior
manager discloses, she would have to rely on the protections of
the state laws.
Second, low-level employees are also relatively unprotected.
They probably are unaware of these new protections. They may
feel particularly oppressed by the many layers of management
that may exist in some corporations.
Some may be
unsophisticated and may not know whether certain actions
violate the law. Many of the wrongful or illegal activities that
they observe may not rise to the level of securities fraud. For
example, an employee at McDonald's may notice that large
numbers of pre-packaged hamburgers disappear shortly after
delivery. The disappearance may be the result of conversion by
the store manager. The McDonald's employee might be in the
best position to ascertain whether this wrongdoing is occurring,
but she is unprotected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because this
conversion does not involve securities fraud. She will have to
rely on the vagaries of state law. In addition, many of these
employees rely very heavily on their paychecks; a high turnover
rate exists in these jobs. Students and those re-entering the
workforce hold many of these jobs. These individuals may be
particularly reluctant to "rock the boat" and report wrongdoing
unless they are guaranteed that their job is protected. The Act
does nothing to address this population of whistleblowers.
Third, for both senior executives and low-level employees,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gives little guidance as to the
circumstances under which an employee is to disclose allegations
of wrongdoing to her supervisor as opposed to law enforcement
authorities. Senior executives also have an obligation to use
"reasonable efforts" to disclose to the principal information,
which is "relevant to affairs entrusted to [the agent]" and which
the principal would desire to have. 121 To some extent, this
decision may be a judgment call by the whistleblowing employee.
In some instances, however, the whistleblowing employee who
reports wrongdoing to her supervisor might not be doing enough

121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 381.
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to stem the wrongdoing behavior. For instance, once she has
made the report, the wrongdoing supervisor might exclude the
employee from access to information that would allow her to
continue to observe the wrongful behavior. In those cases, the
reporting employee may have breached her duty of care to the
corporation by using insufficient actions to stop the wrongdoing.
In addition, her reports to her supervisor may give notice to the
supervisor to claim that he had no knowledge. Conversely, if the
whistleblowing employee reports the evidence of wrongdoing
immediately to law enforcement authorities, she may be
violating her duty of loyalty to the corporation especially if her
allegations are unfounded. These senior-executives are subject
to a duty not to use or to communicate confidential information
acquired during their employment, "unless the information is a
matter of general knowledge." 122 She has an obligation to protect
certain proprietary and confidential corporate information. Also
by going to the law enforcement authorities right away, she may
be depriving the corporation of the opportunity to resolve the
matter or, in the case of wrongdoing, get the best deal for the
corporation. In addition, the employee who jumps the gun and
goes to law enforcement authorities may be putting herself in a
difficult political situation at her corporation. Even though the
terms of her position and employment may remain the same, she
will always, to her detriment, be remembered for making that
report.
Fourth, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gives no guidance
concerning whether the whistleblowing employee should disclose
the information to her direct supervisor or her supervisor's
supervisor. Who is the principal of senior executives? Is it the
corporation? Is it the board of directors? Is it the senior
executive's boss? To some extent, this decision may be a
judgment call by the whistleblowing employee.
In some
instances, however, the whistleblowing employee who reports
wrongdoing to her direct supervisor might not be doing enough
to prevent the wrongdoing behavior. For instance, as stated
above, once she has made the report, the wrongdoing supervisor
might also exclude the employee from access to information that
would allow her to continue to observe the wrongful behavior. In
those cases, the reporting employee may have breached her duty

122

Id. § 395.
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of care to the corporation by using insufficient actions to stem
the wrongdoing. In addition, her reports to her supervisor may
have put him on notice to claim that he had no knowledge. In
those cases, she may be required to report the wrongdoing to a
higher level of authority in the corporation. By immediately
going to the supervisor's supervisor, however, she may be
depriving her direct supervisor of the opportunity to resolve the
matter, which might be in the best interest of the corporation
and the supervisor. In addition, the employee who "jumps the
gun" and goes to her supervisor's supervisor may be putting
herself in a difficult political situation at her corporation in that
her direct supervisor may never trust her. If she discloses to her
supervisor's supervisor, she may be perceived as a "rat fink,"
which may be a career-limiting move.
Fifth, the legislative history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
states that the employee's actions have to be reasonable in
making reports. 123 Employee actions will be deemed reasonable
depending on the types of actions taken by the corporation or the
investigating agency. In the context of suspected wrongdoing by
others, the senior executives may be in a precarious position.
Most cases may not be as clear-cut as the one involving Sherron
Watkins. Because she was an accountant, she had a very good
idea that Enron's accounting policies were illegal. For most
other whistleblowers, they may have only a slight inkling that
something might be amiss. In those circumstances, what are
they supposed to do?
Depending on the nature of the
corporation, they may have an obligation to investigate further.
We then may require the senior executives of major corporations
to be "Nancy Drew, Girl Detective." With downsizing and more
responsibilities, many of these employees already have many
additional responsibilities. If, however, they fail to properly
investigate their suspicions, they may violate their duty of care
to the corporation. In addition, although Senator Leahy stated
that the Act protects whistleblowers who report and disclose
their reasonable suspicions, 124 the statutory language fails to
explicitly provide such protection. Whistleblowers who report
and disclose their reasonable suspicions are in a tough spot if
their allegations turn out to be unfounded. The Sarbanes-Oxley
123 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VIII OF H.R. 2673: THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002, 148 CONG. REc. S7420 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
124

See id.
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Act's statutory protections will fail to protect the whistleblower's
ensuing loss of credibility among her corporate peers.
Sixth, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits a corporation from
"discharg[ing],
demot [ing],
suspend[ing],
threaten[ing],
harass[ing], or in any other manner discriminat[ing] against an
employee in the terms and conditions of employment" because
she blew the whistle. 125 Senator Leahy conceded, however, that
"most corporate employers, with help from their lawyers, know
exactly what they can do to a whistleblowing employee under the
law." 126 The types of retaliation that can occur include: (1)
"attacking the [whistleblower's] motives, credibility, [or]
professional competence"; 127 (2) "build[ing] a damaging record
against [the whistleblower]";128 (3) threatening the employee
with "reprisals for whistleblowing"; 129 (4) "reassign[ing]" the
employee to an isolated work location; 130 (5) "publicly
humiliat[ing]" the employee; 131 (6) "set[ting] . . . up [the
whistleblower] for failure" by putting them in impossible
assignments; 132 (7) "prosecut[ing the employee] for unauthorized
disclosures [of information]";133 (8) "reorganiz[ing]" the company
so that the whistleblower's job is eliminated; 3 4 and (9)
"blacklist[ing]" the whistleblower so she will be unable to work
in the industry. 135 Of course some methods on this list would
clearly violate the Act. A deft supervisor, however, could "set up"
the whistleblowing employee for failure. For instance, the
employer may place the whistleblower in a job unsuitable to her
skill level to ensure her failure. The employer could then
document the employee's poor performance. The Act provides
protections for whistleblowing employees except in cases where
valid business reasons exist for their termination like inferior
work performance. In addition, even if the employer refrains
from discriminating against the whistleblowing employee in the
125
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terms and conditions of her employment, the employer is
unlikely to give that employee any opportunities for
advancement. By blowing the whistle, she may have "tapped
out" her career trajectory. For instance, Sherron Watkins's
present job and terms of employment are probably very secure,
but can we really imagine her ever advancing from her present
position at Enron? Her future supervisors will probably always
worry that she is not a "team player" who may go over their
heads when she suspects they are doing something wrong.
CONCLUSION

Despite the recent positive press concerning corporate
The
whistleblowers, it is fraught with grave dangers.
whistleblower is under simultaneous duties of loyalty and care.
By reporting suspicious activities, the whistleblower may violate
her duty of loyalty to the corporation by misusing corporate
proprietary information, but at the same time the failure to
report such activities may be a violation of the duty of care. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides the whistleblower with some
federal protection against retaliation but does not ease the
tension between the whistleblower's duty of care and loyalty. In
addition, there are several matters that the Act fails to address
or provide sufficient protection, i.e., (1) non-securities fraud
matters are not covered; (2) low-level employees may not be
aware of the protections; (3) no guidance is given as to when to
report wrongdoing to outside authorities or to a supervisor; (4)
no guidance is given as to when the whistleblower should go over
his or her supervisor's head to senior management; and (5) no
protection is given to undercover retaliations that do not quite
manifest themselves as a "discharge, demotion, suspension,
threat, or other manner of discrimination." In promulgating its
rules in implementing this matter, the SEC, to the extent
possible, should take some of these limitations of the Act into
account. As a consequence, the corporate whistleblower cannot
just pucker and blow. She has to use a great deal of thought to
whether and how she may want to blow the whistle.

